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Nowadays, the fact that Networked Critical Infrastructures (NCI), e.g., power plants, 
water plants, oil and gas distribution infrastructures, and electricity grids, are targeted by 
significant cyber threats is well known. Nevertheless, recent research has shown that 
specific characteristics of NCI can be exploited in the enabling of more efficient mitigation 
techniques, while novel techniques from the field of IP networks can bring significant 
advantages. In this paper we explore the interconnection of NCI communication 
infrastructures with Software Defined Networking (SDN)-enabled network topologies. 
SDN   provides the means to create virtual networking services and to implement global 
networking decisions. It relies on OpenFlow to enable communication with remote devices 
and has been recently categorized as the “Next Big Technology”, which will revolutionize 
the way decisions are implemented in switches and routers. Therefore, the paper 
documents the first steps towards enabling an SDN-NCI and presents the impact of a 
Denial of Service experiment over traffic resulting from an XBee sensor network which is 
routed across an emulated SDN network. 
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The adoption of Commodity Of The Shelf 
(COTS) hardware and software in the architecture of 
modern Networked Critical Infrastructures (NCI) 
created a novel palette of features and capabilities. 
The high penetration of these devices even within the 
core of NCI paved the way for service 
interoperability, interconnection of networks, remote 
monitoring and control, new financial services, as 
well as the newly emerging Smart Grid. 
These large-scale infrastructures deployed across 
city, regional, national or even over international 
geographical areas provide the basic services that our 
society depends on. Consequently, the disturbance of 
their normal functionality either from natural causes, 
malfunctioning, or cyber attacks can have a “serious 
impact on the health, safety, security or economic 
well-being of citizens” [3]. Taking for instance the 
example of the next electricity grid, nowadays known 
as Smart Grid, it is foreseen that the deployment of 
large-scale Smart Grids will provision several 
indisputable advantages and benefits, e.g., improved 
operational benefits of control, reliability and safety, 
advanced two-way communications, and more 
flexible integration of heterogeneous measurement 
and sensor-actuator networks. Nevertheless, recent 
incidents and scientific research has shown that these 
are also being exposed to significant risks [10], [1]. 
The discovery of the Stuxnet [2] malware, the world’s 
first (discovered) malware capable to rewrite the 
control logic of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) 
hardware, marked a turning point in how cyber 
security specialists view the security of these 
infrastructures. Subsequently, the potential impact of 
cyber attacks in the power sector has been highlighted 
by the Tempe, AZ incident [15] from 2007. In this 
particular case an improper configuration of load 
shedding programs caused the opening of 141 
breakers and a loss of significant load, which 
subsequently led to a 46 min power outage affecting 
almost 100 000 customers. 
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In this context the deployment of effective 
protective mechanisms and the adoption of novel 
techniques to mitigate attacks are considered an 
international priority. In this paper we explore the 
applicability of Software Defined Networking (SDN) 
[13] in the implementation of security experiments 
for NCI. SDN is a newly emerging trend which 
intends to replace switch-based configurations with 
an external software control pane, leading to more 
flexible and highly dynamic routing decisions. 
The approach described in this paper combines in 
a unique way different experimentation capabilities in 
order to enable experimentation with SDN-based 
networks, Smart Grid-specific protocols, as well as a 
wide variety of sensor networks. The paper 
documents the first steps towards enabling an SDN- 
NCI and presents the impact of a Denial of Service 
experiment over traffic originating from an XBee 
sensor network which is routed over an emulated 
SDN network. 
The remaining of this paper is organized as 
follows: Section 2 provides an overview of related 
work, emphasizing at the same time the novelty and 
significance of the work beforehand; Section 3 
provides an overview of the proposed approach for 
enabling SDN experiments in NCI; Section 4 
provides experimental results consisting of a real 
sensor network recreated with MaspMote and 
Meshlium modules; the paper concludes in Section 5. 
 
2. Related work 
The possible impact of cyber attacks on the 
normal functioning of NCI and finally on society, 
have brought the topic of NCI security in the attention 
of academia, industry and policy makers. As such, 
today we find a wide range of theoretical approaches, 
recommendations and practical solutions to secure 
NCI assets. 
The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology’s (NIST) “Guide to Industrial Control 
Systems” [12] provides a wide range of techniques 
and best practices to enhance the security of ICS. 
Defense-in-depth is strongly recommended in order 
to provide multiple layers of defense and detection. 
Network segmentation combined with correctly 
configured firewalls can raise significant barriers in 
the path of cyber attackers. 
State-of-the-art IP networking solutions can bring 
significant advantages in the mitigation of attacks. 
Internet Protocol/Multi-Protocol Label Switching 
(IP/MPLS) provides the ability to define virtual 
circuits and separate routing tables [5], [8]. Different 
traffic flows can be separated and QoS-based 
techniques can be applied in order to reduce the 
interference of different flows [5]. 
Intrusion/anomaly detection systems also 
represent an important line of proactive defense 
strategy in the architecture of NCI. Recent 
advancements in the field of NCI security highlighted 
the advantages of anomaly detection techniques to 
efficiently detect abnormal behavior [7], [6], [14], 
[16], [4] in the context of NCI. 
 
 
Fig. 1: The proposed experimentation architecture 
 
The abovementioned techniques represent recent 
advancement in raising the security bar for the 
protection of NCI. Nevertheless, research concerning 
SDN is in an embryonic state and to the best of our 
knowledge the experimentation technique presented 
in this paper is the first reported approach to combine 
different capabilities and enabling conducting 
experiments with NCI and SDN. 
 
3. Proposed approach for enabling SDN 
experiments with NCI 
An emerging trend in traditional IP networks is 
the replacement of local router-based decision 
solutions with global routing decision solutions. A 
well-recognized enabler of this technique is 
OpenFlow, a protocol designed to ensure remote 
access to the forwarding pane of a network switch. 
This way, separation of control from forwarding is 
achieved, and more complex traffic management 
techniques can be implemented. OpenFlow can also 
bridge the gap between different network 
switch/router providers since the same protocol can 
be used to program a wide range of OpenFlow-
enabled hardware devices. 
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) [13] 
provides the means to create virtual networking 
services and to implement global networking 
decisions. It relies on OpenFlow to enable 
communication with remote devices and has been 
recently categorized as the “Next Big Technology”, 
which will revolutionize the way decisions are 
implemented in switches and routers. SDN provides a 
directly programmable network that is managed 
centrally, can be monitored and configured remotely, 
and it is based on open standards. Therefore, 
OpenFlow and SDN can be seen as the technologies 
which provide the next generation networking 
capabilities for Smart Grid. These can be integrated 
and used in the implementation of more reliable and 
dynamic networking solutions, which could be also 
coupled with monitoring systems such as 
Intrusion/Anomaly Detection Systems in order to 
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close an important loop. 
Based on the experimental capabilities offered by 
OpenFlow and SDN we propose an architecture 
which combines the effective power of software-
defined network topology construction with the 
physical properties of critical infrastructures. The 
proposed architecture is shown in Fig. 1. 
The experimentation network is recreated through 
an emulated approach by using the Mininet platform 
[11], [9]. Mininet provides capabilities to emulate a 
“network in a laptop” by using virtualization 
capabilities of modern Operating Systems: process 
name spaces are used to group host-based processes 
together; virtual network interfaces provide 
communication capabilities with hosts inside the 
emulated network, as well as with real hosts outside 
the emulation domain; Open vSwitch (OVS) comes 
preinstalled in Mininet and provides a realistic 
recreation of switching capabilities. 
In terms of SDN controllers in the literature we 
find several such controller implementations: NOX, 
POX, Beacon, Floodlight, and OpenDaylight. Most of 
the available open controllers provide basic controller 
functionalities. However, in case network topologies 
exhibit loops and require the injection of static flows 
to work together with such loops, few of the 
controllers are able to satisfy these constraints. 
Subsequently, controllers must be easily 
programmable, they must expose an interface to 
communicate with real OpenFlow-enabled switches 
and they must support experiments with large 
networks as well. 
Therefore, the adopted approach relies on 
Floodlight as an SDN controller enabler. The 
controller monitors the network and can take 
decisions in order to re-route traffic, to drop packets 
and to run complex traffic engineering algorithms. 
On the other hand, communications with the 
physical domain is handled through a Sensor data 
server which collects data from Sensor gateway and 
forwards it on request to clients connected to the 
emulated network. An important aspect that should be 
mentioned at this point is that the software and 
protocols running on top of the emulated network are 
realistic and therefore they are capable to interact 
with each-other. This leads to the establishment of a 
complex environment where communications are 
routed over an emulated network and specific 
software components are running in the context of 
real operating systems. 
Subsequently, this enables the integration of real 
communications originating from sensor networks. 
Since a major aspect of NCI is the actual gathering of 
data from sensor networks spread across a large area, 
the approach couples the two domains through the 
Sensor data server. This component plays the role of 
data gateway between the sensor network and the 
emulated network. 
The main advantage of the approach is that it 
provides a flexible way to experiment with different 
traffic engineering algorithms as well as different 
network topologies. The approach is well suited to 
test the behavior of industrial protocols while routing 
is performed in an SDN-enabled environment. 
 
4. Experimental results 
In order to illustrate the applicability of the 
approach in cyber security experiments we created 
the setup presented in Fig. 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2: Experiment setup 
 
The sensor network consists of several WaspMote 
sensor nodes equipped with XBee Pro 
communication modules. Each WaspMote node 
transmits the measured temperature and battery level 
to the sensor gateway implemented with a Meshlium 
gateway. Meshlium collects the data and stores it in a 
local MySQL database. From there, the data is 
periodically read by the sensor data server which 
exposes an XMPP interface to enable communication 
with client applications. 
A client application was developed in Python 
language which communicates with the sensor data 
server through a Mininet network supervised by an 
SDN controller. A synthetic attack was implemented 
with the iperf tool. The attack flooded the network 
with UDP packets which lead to the disturbance of 
communications and regular monitoring traffic. All 
network links have been limited to 1Mbit/sec. 
As shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 once the attack is 
launched it pushes the traffic throughput up to the 
link capacity. This leads to significant disturbance of 
the regular XMPP/TCP traffic, which is more visible 
in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6. 
Once the attack is started the regular traffic 
experiences significant loss and delay. Nevertheless, 
once the attack stops, TCP protocol is able to restore 
normal traffic throughput by sending at first a large 
burst of delayed packets, significantly visible in Fig. 
5 and Fig. 6. 
This experiment has shown that cyber security 
experiments with complex systems such as large-
scale NCI are possible through the approach 
presented in this paper. The technique constitutes the 
first steps towards a comprehensive framework that 
closes the loop between monitoring, 














This paper demonstrated that experiments with 
Software Defined Networking in the context of 
Networked Critical Infrastructures can be conducted 
by adopting open source technologies such as 
Mininet, Floodlight, Iperf, and XMPP. Such 
techniques are necessary since more and more sensors 
are being integrated into our social lives every day. 
The data gathered from these sensors needs to be 
transported and stored in specific places across large-
scale distributed communication networks. In this 
context novel technologies based on SDN are being 
accepted and deployed for this purpose, due to their 
many advantages. 
Therefore, we consider that the technique 
proposed in this paper constitutes a significant 
progress in the unification of the two worlds: the 
cyber and the physical dimensions of NCI. 
Furthermore, we consider that the experiments 
presented in this paper illustrate the important impact 
of cyber attacks on normal communications. As 
future work we intend to evaluate different strategies 
in mitigating cyber attacks and to identify novel 
techniques to close a significant loop in cyber 
security: the loop between monitoring/detection and 
the actual mitigation of attacks. 
 
 
Fig. 5: Filtered normal (TCP) traffic: effect of attack on 
regular packet count 
 
 
Fig. 6: Filtered normal (TCP) traffic: effect of attack on 
regular traffic throughput 
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